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Fake News? A Critical Analysis of the ‘Welfare Cheats, Cheat Us 
All’ Campaign in Ireland 
 
Abstract  
Using qualitative content analysis, informed by a Critical Discourse Analysis 
(CDA) approach, this article examines the production, content and reception of 
print and online media discourses concerning the 2017 ‘Welfare Cheats, Cheat 
Us All' campaign in the Republic of Ireland.   Our article is situated in the context 
of recent debates concerning the media’s role in articulating ‘disgust’ discourses 
focused on ‘welfare fraud’, poverty and unemployment. Central to these 
processes is the social construction of those who are deemed to be the 
‘deserving poor’ or the ‘undeserving poor’. Our corpus includes records of in-
house debate within the Department of Social Protection; the campaign’s 
documentation; print media and on-line media coverage of the campaign.  The 
article’s findings demonstrate the ways in which welfare ‘fraud’ is mis-
represented by the state and media.  It also evidences ways in which such 
hegemonic discourses can be challenged in traditional and ‘new’ media settings.  
 
Keywords: Welfare; Welfare Cheats; Class Disgust ‘Deserving Poor’; Neo-
Liberalism, Moral Underclass Discourses. 
 
Introduction 
The media’s role in demonising people on welfare and in articulating classed and 
gendered disgust discourses has been well documented (see for example Tyler, 2008), 
as has its wider ideological role in supporting the interests of the powerful through the 
spread of dominant ideological discourses (Devereux, 2014). The widespread use of 
moral underclass discourses (see Levitas, 2000) – which are presented as being 
‘natural’, ‘inevitable’ and full of ‘common sense’– has resulted in welfare recipients being 
routinely represented within media and other discourses as being distrustful and in 
need of surveillance and punishment. This has, arguably, become even more acute in a 
neo-liberal context as the politically and economically powerful continue to further 
shrink the state’s welfare role, reduce taxation and increase levels of privatisation.   
Following the work of CDA scholars like Fairclough (1995), Van Dijk (1998) and 
Wodak and Meyer (2008) who have examined the relationship between language, 
power and social interests, as media sociologists we are interested in the ways in which 
discourses work ideologically. In this regard, we ask where do dominant discourses 
actually come from? Is it possible through a systematic analysis of media content to 
identify recurring patterns of language which facilitate the perpetuation of unequal 
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power relationships? Are they based upon empirical evidence, well-worn tropes or 
mythologies? Whose interests are served by their very existence? Do these discourses 
have a role to play in determining social action (or inaction)? Can these discourses be 
shown to influence the decisions of politicians and policymakers? To what extent can 
such hegemonic discourses which are created and disseminated by the politically and 
economically powerful be resisted through the creation of counter-narratives? And in 
what circumstances do such discourses become exposed for what they really are, i.e. 
primarily representing the perspectives and interests of the powerful?  
In this article we attempt to answer these questions by reference to a recent 
contentious case in the Republic of Ireland. In the weeks leading up to the election of a 
new leader for the governing Centre-Right Fine Gael party (June 2017), one of the two 
contenders – Leo Varadkar – instigated a highly publicised anti-welfare fraud campaign 
in his capacity as Minister for Social Protection.1 The ‘Welfare Cheats, Cheat Us All’ 
(original emphasis) campaign cost €200,845. Varadkar somewhat controversially 
claimed, in his wider election bid, to represent ‘the people who get up early in the 
morning’ (Bardon, 2017). His use of this carefully chosen phrase – with its intimations 
of‘deservedness’/’undeservedness’ – in his leadership campaign was revealing in that it 
was not only a coded message to his supporters within the Fine Gael party; it was also a 
way of identifying (and othering) those members of Irish society that he, and thus by 
extension Fine Gael, do not represent.2  
As media sociologists we are interested in debates concerning 
ideology/dominant ideology (in the Neo-Marxist sense) and discourse. Our guiding 
theoretical lens is broadly Gramscian (for a detailed discussion on Gramsci and 
language, see Ives, 2004). Gramsci recognises the ways in which hegemony is primarily 
achieved through consent. Public knowledge (and acceptance of the status quo) is 
shaped through discourses which rely on the selective use of language to explain the 
social world and, if effective, contribute to the continuation of unequal power 
relationships.  
Using qualitative content analysis, informed by a Critical Discourse Analysis 
(CDA) approach, we examine the production, content and reception of media discourses 
                                                             
1 Mr. Varadkar would eventually succeed in becoming leader of Fine Gael.  
 
2 It is interesting to note that Leo Varadkar has also made other controversial comments 
concerning Community Employment Schemes for long-term welfare recipients 
(which were described as not being ‘real work’) and Council Estates. In 2018, in the 
course of criticising the Socialist perspective on housing, he stated: ‘…They want to 
divide our society into people who live in different areas, with some people paying 
for everything but qualifying for nothing. It is the wrong way of doing it’  (Dail 
Debates, Houses of the Oireachtas, September 26, 2018, emphasis added).   
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concerning the  2017 ‘Welfare Cheats, Cheat Us All' campaign3 in the Republic of Ireland.  
Our overall corpus includes a series of internal memos which were circulated within the 
Department of Social Protection in the lead up to the launch of the campaign (Foxe,  
cited in Sheridan,2017); the campaign’s supporting documentation, including its press 
release and ad campaign; print media coverage of the campaign launch and its 
aftermath, as well as a series of tweets (using the hashtag #Ratforleo) which evidenced 
the emergence of a counter-hegemonic narrative to the state sponsored discourse.  
Our article is organised as follows:    
(1) Having summarised our methodological approach and the parameters of our 
data-set, we provide a critical account of the background to the ‘Welfare Cheats 
Cheat Us All’ campaign by discussing the social consequences of the post-2008 
economic collapse and crisis.    
(2) We outline recent debates concerning the media’s role in articulating ‘disgust’ 
discourses focused on ‘welfare fraud’, poverty and unemployment. Central to 
these processes is the social construction of those who are deemed to be the 
‘deserving poor or the ‘undeserving poor’. 
(3) We present our analysis of the dominant discourses evident in (a) the in-house 
discussions in the lead up to the campaign; (b) the campaign documentation 
itself; (c) print media coverage of the campaign.  
(4) Finally, as a counterpoint, we discuss the presence of a counter-hegemonic 
narrative reference originating in an online campaign on Twitter.  
Methodological Approach  
A qualitative content analysis was undertaken on a corpus of materials including 
internal department memos; the campaign’s press release and associated advertising 
materials; one month of print media coverage and a sample of tweets using the hashtag 
‘#Ratforleo’. We subjected the memos sourced from the Department of Social Protection 
under the Freedom of Information Act to a close critical reading.  Our semantic reading 
of the memos in question revealed an interesting debate concerning the contours of the 
                                                             
3 The Creed agency was awarded the contract.. The summary of the campaign on their 
website states: ‘People who cheat the Welfare literally cheat us all. But for some 
reason, it's seen as a victimless crime. Socially acceptable and widely abused. Our 
campaign aimed to raise the debate and start a conversation about welfare 
fraud. Reports of welfare cheats doubled in the first week, social media went into 
meltdown and all main publications and news outlets spread the word. The 
campaign was a huge success and got people debating the rights and wrongs of 




imminent campaign in terms of overall strategy and the language to be used.4 We also 
scrutinised the campaign’s press release and its associated advertising content. We 
systematically analysed both the language used (descriptors) in all of the texts and the 
visual imagery employed in the actual campaign. The campaign materials (posters, 
newspaper adverts, etc.) were analysed both discursively and semiotically.  
Newspaper coverage was sourced from Nexis using the search terms ‘Welfare’, 
‘Fraud’, ‘Cheats’ and ‘Varadkar’. The titles examined5 were The Irish Times; the Irish 
Examiner; the Sunday Business Post; the Irish Daily Mail; the Sunday Independent and the 
Irish Independent.6 We analysed newspaper coverage for a period of one month (April 
18, 2017 to May 18, 2017).7 A total of 26 newspaper articles were analysed.8 The texts 
include both news articles and letters to the editor, since the latter provide further 
insight into public discourse and individual newspapers’ editorial stance. All of the 
newspaper articles were hand-coded in terms of the language used to describe Mr 
Varadkar; Social Welfare; Social Welfare Recipients and Social Welfare Fraud. The 
articles were also classified in terms of their overall stance on the campaign, i.e. did they 
accept, question or critique the assumptions of the Welfare ‘Cheats’ campaign. We also 
examined the articles in terms of likely source bias. Tweets using the hashtag 
‘#Ratforleo’ were gathered for the same time period as the newspapers and were 
categorised in terms of whether the hashtag was used in an ironic or critical way (i.e. to 
spread a counter-hegemonic interpretation of what the campaign was actually about).  
                                                             
4 The memos (which amount to 465 pages) were disclosed to the journalist and 
academic Ken Foxe for the Right To Know organisation under the Freedom of 
Information Act (Foxe, 2017). 
5 It is also worth noting that, while print media organisations subscribe to a voluntary 
code of conduct set out by the Irish Press Council the print media titles in question 
were also direct beneficiaries of the campaign through the placement of paid 
advertising. 
6 The Irish Times, which has a ‘liberal pluralist’ ideological orientation and is owned by 
a trust, is widely considered to be the newspaper of record in the Republic of 
Ireland. The other newspapers are privately owned and occupy centre (The Irish 
Examiner; the Sunday Business Post), centre-right (the Irish Independent; the 
Sunday Independent) and rightwing populist (the Irish Daily Mail) ideological 
positions. 
7 The selected timeframe runs from the day the Welfare Cheats campaign was launched 
to the announcement of the Fine Gael leadership contest. The then leader Enda 
Kenny announced his resignation as being effective from midnight on May 17.  
8 These breakdown as follows Irish Daily Mail (6); The Irish Examiner (6) the Irish 
Independent and Sunday Independent (9); the Irish Times (4)  and the Sunday 
Business Post (1).  
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The social consequences of economic crisis and collapse in Ireland 
Ireland’s economy has very recently gone through a spectacular boom and bust cycle. 
European banks made enormous sums of ‘cheap’ money available to Irish banks, who 
increasingly used it to fund property speculation (Allen, 2009, p. 48). While the resulting 
construction boom created enormous wealth for many (including the Irish State) the 
illusion of our economic miracle (see Share & Corcoran, 2010) was laid bare by the 
global economic crash of 2008. Ultimately, it played a major role in the government 
having to use ‘the entire Irish State as collateral for the crushing liabilities of six private 
banks’ (McCabe, 2011, p. 169). In 2010, Ireland entered into a ‘programme’ and received 
funding from the Troika of the EU, IMF and European Central Bank as the country faced 
a sovereign debt crisis. As a consequence, Ireland gained the dubious distinction of 
becoming the most (bank) debt burdened country in the EU (see Taft, 2013a cited in 
O’Flynn et al., 2014, p. 924). The total cost of these banking losses has been calculated to 
be approximately ‘€35 billion or 22% of Ireland’s nominal GDP in 2011’. Without this 
cost, Ireland’s debt-GDP ratio in 2011 could have been more or less the Eurozone 
average (Whelan, 2012). Both the decision to pay the socialised private banking debt 
and the programme of austerity which followed are rooted in neo-liberal ideology, 
which seeks to ‘frame and shape individuals’ perceptions and preferences so as to pre-
empt challenges to the status quo’ (Glasberg, 2011, p. 48). 
The payment of ‘promissory notes’9 which began on March 31, 2011, and of the 
€700 million (unguaranteed and unsecured) Anglo Irish Bank bond on the November 2, 
2011 (see Donagh, 2011 for details) in particular, have been hard to stomach for many 
Irish people.10 Moreover, between 2007/08 and 2011, €20bn (12% of GDP) was taken 
out of the economy in successive austerity budgets, which in conjunction with the 
repayment of banking debt produced massive social consequences for (in particular the 
most vulnerable) people in this country (see EAPNI, 2018, p. 3). Irish poverty/social 
exclusion rates (which were already higher than the EU-15 average before the 
recession) significantly increased in contrast to stable rates in other EU-15 countries 
(Taft, 2012). Since the onset of the recession, the number of people in poverty has 
increased by more than 110,000. In 2015 the incomes of 16.9% of the population fell 
below the 60% poverty line (€12,000 disposable income p/a), rising from 14.1% of the 
population in 2009 (EAPNI, 2018, pp. 3-4). There were more than three quarters of a 
million people living in poverty (Social Justice Ireland, 2016, p. 1) in a country with a 
national population of only 4,757,976 (2016 census).  
                                                             
9 The promissory notes were to be paid at a rate of €3.1 billion per year every year on 
March 31 through to 2023, €2.1 billion in 2024, €0.9 billion a year from 2025-
2030, and a final payment of €0.1 billion in 2031. 
 
10 For example, for five years (2011 – 2016) on every Sunday morning after Mass, locals 
in the North Cork towns of Ballyhea/Charleville held a protest against the bailout 
of unidentified bondholders by the Irish state (see Baker, 2016).  
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The 2016 data on poverty showed that 18.8% of Ireland’s adults living below the 
poverty line were employed, while 18.6% (230,000) of children resided in a household 
whose income was below the poverty line. Overall children represented almost one-
third (30.6%) of Ireland’s poor (Social Justice Ireland, 2016, p.1). Consistent poverty has 
also increased significantly, with 8% of the population (approximately 370,000 people) 
experiencing it by 2014 (Social Justice Ireland, 2016, p. 4). Moreover, since 2007 the 
deprivation rate has more than doubled (Social Justice Ireland, 2016, p. 1), rising from 
11.8% in 2007 to 30.5% in 2013, before falling back slightly to 25.5% in 2015. Those 
experiencing material deprivation more than doubled (from 4.2% to 9.1%) from 2008 
to 2013, before reducing slightly to 8.7% (approximately 403,279 people) in 2015 
(EAPNI, 2018, p. 4). By 2016 there were over 1.3 million people (29% of the population) 
experiencing deprivation (Social Justice Ireland, 2016, p. 1). This situation has been 
compounded by high levels of income inequality in Ireland, which increased during the 
crisis, and while they have reduced they are still much higher than before the crisis 
began (EAPNI, 2018, p. 4). 
Ireland is a strong performer in using social transfers to reduce inequality, yet 
this hides the fact that inequality in Ireland before social transfers is among the highest 
in the EU (EAPNI, 2018, p. 4). Indeed, Social Justice Ireland (2016, p. 7) (in their analysis 
of budgets between 2011 and 2016) show that in budget after budget, ‘government 
choices, whether cuts or increases, have favoured the better-off in our society’. It is also 
important to note that in post-Celtic Tiger boom Ireland, given the cost of the social 
welfare budget annually, the government has been directly and indirectly cutting social 
welfare for a wide range of recipients. In examining one of the most vulnerable groups 
in Irish society, single parents, we saw that more than half of these households were at 
risk of poverty and social exclusion by 2012, with Government policies, through a 
‘sustained and substantial attack’ (Taft, 2012) making their situation worse (see Taft, 
2012 for a fuller discussion of these policies and their impact).  
Successive governments also made it increasingly difficult for the unemployed to 
receive ongoing support as some government Ministers began to talk of unemployment 
as a ‘lifestyle choice’. For example, the Labour Leader and Social Protection Minister, 
Joan Burton commented 
What we are getting at the moment is people who come into the 
(social protection) system straight after school as a lifestyle choice. 
This is not acceptable, everyone should be expected to contribute and 
work. (cited in Taft, 2013; see also McConnell et al., 2011) 
These kinds of discourses began to appear with increasing regularity, particularly in the 
run up to the annual Budget and we argue that they served the purpose of ‘legitimising’ 
cuts that were subsequently made by government, to the wider public. If the general 
public is to support high levels of welfare spending, particularly in times of economic 
crisis, then citizens must be kept informed of the needs of those requiring the assistance 
of the welfare state, and the costs of addressing those needs (Lens, 2002). In that 
context, it was worrying to see numerous politicians from Fine Gael, Labour & Fianna 
Fáil claiming that massive social welfare fraud was / is occurring. For example, in 2011, 
then Minister of State, Fergus O’Dowd, claimed that there was widespread fraud in the 
social welfare system, costing the state somewhere in the region of €600m (see Taft, 
2011), assertions which were uncritically repeated in the print and broadcast media and 
by many other commentators. Yet the €600 million figure of welfare fraud was in reality 
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a ‘control saving’. This means that ‘if there were no controls or inspections’, there would 
be a guesstimated ‘€600 million in over-payments over time, but crucially fraud would 
only account for a minority of these over-payments’ (Taft, 2011). Indeed, the Irish 
State’s own auditor, the Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG), identified a number 
of issues with these control savings, stating that ‘… the Department’s current practice of 
including all of these over-payments arising from control activity as (bankable) savings 
is questionable’ (cited in Taft, 2011,) As Taft elaborates, fraud was actually accounted 
for at a rate of ‘€21 million in 2007, rising to €26 million by 2010’, figures which are 
approximately 0.1% of the Department of Social Protections’ budget. Thus, we concur 
with Taft’s assertion that ‘to talk of €600 million in fraud is highly fraudulent’ ).  
Debates concerning media coverage of welfare ‘fraud’; class disgust; poverty, 
unemployment and ‘deservedness’ 
In further scapegoating ‘blameworthy’ and ‘lazy’ welfare recipients and justifying 
‘savings’, politicians and the media repeatedly sensationalise ‘social welfare fraud’. The 
people of Ireland (and elsewhere) are routinely exposed to television investigations by 
leading state and commercial stations, print media coverage and vocal pronouncements 
from establishment politicians claiming that massive fraud is occurring. Ireland’s 
commercial TV311 station has been quite enthusiastic about this. Between 2011 and 
2013, the station repeatedly aired the same documentary on ‘dole cheats’ from the 
series Paul Connolly Investigates. The TV3 website description of the documentary 
reads: ‘Paul takes a look at the rampant [sic] problem of social welfare fraud occurring 
in Ireland’ (TV3 Player, 2013). Whether consciously intended or not, each time this was 
aired it helped to further crystallise ‘common-sense’ responses to the crisis where ever 
deeper cuts to social welfare appeared reasonable and something any ‘right minded’ 
person would expect. Following the work of George Gerbner, we hold the repeated 
circulation of these anti-welfare discourses serve to cultivate audience/public 
understandings of issues pertaining to welfare (see Gerbner & Gross, 1976).  
And, if claims of fraud and laziness were insufficient, other rationalisations 
helped to frame the regressive measures contained in the Social Welfare Bill of 
December 2012 as warranted, such as women’s ‘immorality’ and/or ‘imprudence’. Such 
judgements were offered most enthusiastically by Fine Gael TD Derek Keating who 
decided to highlight single mothers who were framed as promiscuous, unwise in their 
choice of partners and abusing the system. With righteous indignation, Keating 
complained of young women who find themselves caring, not for one child or two, but 
for three and four children by multiple fathers who are uncaring and failing in their 
duties of care and support with the consequences picked up by the taxpayer (cited in 
Browne, 2012). These young women were apparently creating ‘a new lifestyle of welfare 
economy’ (Browne, 2012). Keating’s sudden concern about single-mothers’ claims on 
welfare could not have been prompted by any increase in occurrence of single-parent 
claimants, since the number of claimants had dropped from 92,326 in 2010 to 87,735 in 
2012 (Browne, 2012). In any case, as Browne elaborates: 60% (of claimants) have only 
one child, 28% have two children and the remaining circa 12% come in the category of 
having three or more children — with many of these families comprised of women who 
                                                             
11 Since August 30, 2018 TV3 was re-branded as Virgin Media One.  
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are divorced or separated after their marriages broke down. Of course, the strategy 
employed by Keating has a long history and is similarly witnessed in other countries 
(see Skeggs, 2006; Tyler, 2013). In fact, it can be traced at least as far back as Thomas 
Malthus’ opposition to the Old Poor Law (abolished in 1834), which depended on claims 
that the system was facilitating immorality, dependency, irresponsibility and feckless 
breeding (O’Flynn, 2009, p. 98). 
When it comes to efforts to scapegoat vulnerable groups in contemporary 
Ireland, we argue that the political establishment typically prefers anecdotes over facts. 
In 2009, for example, Limerick County Councillor, Liam Galvin (Fine Gael) said that he 
believed that a considerable amount of fraud was being committed through the 
wrongful claiming of welfare ‘benefits’ by foreign nationals. He stated that ‘taxi drivers 
are picking up foreigners at the airport and driving them straight to the welfare office 
and straight back to the airport again’ (Limerick Leader, May 26, cited in Power et al., 
2012, pp. 13–14). Yet, Councillor Galvin’s assertions seem to ignore the fact that since 
2004, all applicants for a wide range of social assistance payments in Ireland had to 
satisfy the Habitual Residence Condition (HRC) (Department of Social Protection, 2010a, 
2010b). 
Crucially, the extent to which these discourses have taken hold among the 
general public – the degree to which they resonate with pre-existing prejudices and 
dominant ideology – has meant that cuts to welfare tend not to be understood as attacks 
on the most vulnerable. Rather, they are framed as a means of tackling the putative 
abuse of the system and the irresponsibility of feckless groups that cannot and should 
not be tolerated in a time of austerity. As an aside, we recognise that such framing is also 
evidenced in Britain with intensified political rhetoric about ‘the welfare 
scrounger/skiver’ and attendant media ‘poverty porn’ which constructs ‘figures of 
disgust’ (Jensen, 2014; O’Flynn et al., 2014, p. 930).   
All of these recent developments in Ireland and elsewhere must also be seen in 
an historical context. By this we mean the long-standing practice – evidenced in the 19th 
Century English Poor Laws for example – of constituting the poor as being either 
‘deserving’ or ‘undeserving’. Devereux (1998) has demonstrated, how, in an Irish 
context, RTE (the public service television broadcaster) constructed the Irish poor as 
being either ‘God’s Poor’ or the ‘Devil’s Poor’. Indeed, researchers like Van Oorschot 
(2006) evidence how the concept of ‘deservingness’ is central to understanding public 
attitudes and beliefs about welfare provision in a wider European setting. Van Oorschot 
(2006) demonstrates how in Ireland (and elsewhere) a hierarchy operates in the public 
mind as to ‘deservingness’. In the Irish case, the highest levels of solidarity are 
expressed towards the elderly, sick and disabled in equal measures. The unemployed 
are placed in the middle with immigrants at the bottom of this schema. Such 
demarcation has become a routine practice in the developed world and is, arguably, 
more acute in an age of neo-liberal politics and economics (for an example of research 
on deservedness, welfare and disability in a Canadian context, see Quintero, 2014). All 
discourses begin somewhere and as we have already noted many have a long history 
and contain echoes of earlier discursive formations. The Welfare Cheats Cheat Us All 
campaign is no exception in this regard.  
 
11 
Analysis of the Welfare Cheats Cheat Us All Campaign   
An FOI request to the Department of Social Protection (DSP) by (2017) revealed the 
high level of detailed planning behind the campaign. The exchange of memos 
commenced in September 2016 and while many of the internal memos were 
understandably of an operational matter – focusing for example on the tendering 
process; its key media components; their production and budgetary constraints – they 
also reveal that the language and overall message of the campaign were the subject of 
detailed discussion and debate.12 It is clear from the memos that the Minister took an 
active role in shaping the campaign. On December 6, 2016, for example, an internal 
memo stated ‘Leo’s thoughts on this are that he likes the [redacted] one. However, he 
feels we need to emphasise more that this is just not money from your pocket; that 
someone else will lose out directly. We want to reduce fraud so we can preserve 
resources for those who need them most. Could that be worked in somehow?’ (DSP 
Memo). Another memo sent on March 23, 2017 summarised the objectives of the 
campaign as being to increase levels of fraud reporting; to alter public perceptions about 
social welfare fraud by underscoring the idea that it is not a victimless crime and to 
stress how seriously welfare fraud is/will be responded to by the Department of Social 
Protection.  
In its nascent phase, the terms ‘fraud hotline campaign’; ‘anti-fraud campaign’ 
and ‘fraud awareness campaign’ were used to describe the project in-house. Concerns 
were also expressed in the in-house exchanges about whether the campaign might be 
confused in the minds of some of the public with another anti-fraud campaign being led 
by the Irish insurance industry. Equally, sensitivities were in evidence concerning the 
planned use of the terms ‘fraud’ and ‘crime’ owing to what was perceived as public 
disquiet with reported scandals involving the Gardai (Irish police force). Perhaps the 
most revealing exchange amongst the department’s officials was that which focused on 
whether or not the media campaign might be better served by using the term ‘cheats’ 
                                                             
12 A variety of personnel were involved in these exchanges including the Head of 
Communications Unit, Department of Social Protection and the Principle, Control 




instead of ‘fraud’.13 Although the Department of Social Protection’s press release issued 
on April 17 and the copy used in the subsequent advertising campaign foregrounded the 
word ‘cheat’ in its headline – ‘Welfare Cheats Cheat Us All’ (original emphasis) - it is 
noteworthy that the term ‘fraud’ occurs ten times in the main body of the press release 
as opposed to just four uses of the word ‘cheat/s/ing’ (two of which occur in the 
launch’s press statement headline). The phrase ‘hard-hitting’ is used three times and the 
document released to the media claims that the department’s antifraud and control 
measures resulted in savings of over €500 million in 2016. It is also revealing that fraud 
is placed before control measures in the press release. It states that 20,800 reports 
alleging fraud were reported in 2016. Of these 300 cases were referred to the State 
Solicitor’s office in order to commence legal proceedings and an additional 160 cases 
were referred to the Director of Public Prosecutions. It further claims that ‘one in three’ 
reports of welfare fraud in 2016 resulted in payments ‘being reduced or stopped’. Three 
categories of welfare recipient are singled out in terms of being the subject of the 
majority of complaints alleging welfare fraud, those on Jobseeker Schemes, those on 
Supplementary Welfare Allowance and those in receipt of One Parent Family Allowance 
Payments.14 In addition to providing details of where ‘whistleblowers’ could report their 
suspicions, the press release concluded by itemising eight typical situations in which 
welfare fraud occurred. Five posters accompanied the campaign.  They mimic the format 
of a simple tick-box survey. Readers are asked to tick ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ in response to 
questions such as ‘Would You Report A Welfare Cheat?’ or ‘Is It OK To Still Claim Illness 
Benefit Once You Have Recovered?’. The simple poster design used white text on a vivid 
red background. Red, of course, is routinely read as signifying danger. It is also 
noteworthy that the press release puts fraud ahead of control measures which have 
resulted in savings for the taxpayer (‘Anti-fraud and control measures in 2016 saved 
over €500 million in expenditure’) thus implying that the extent of fraud is higher than 
it actually is. The focus on the imagined ‘us’ in the campaign (‘…cheat us all’) depends on 
                                                             
13  A memo from the advertising agency tasked with running the campaign dated April 
11 was circulated within the department’s campaign team which stated: ‘Fraud 
means “wrongful or criminal deception intended to result in financial or personal 
gain”. It’s mainly associated with businesses, corporates, businessmen and rich 
people who have committed fraud on a grand scale. It does work as a headline but 
it’s not as powerful as using ‘cheat’. Cheat, means “to act dishonestly or unfairly in 
order to gain an advantage”. It’s far more colloquial and it’s how people really 
speak to each other. People don’t say ‘Marie committed Welfare fraud’, they say 
‘she cheated the Welfare’. Cheating is also a far more emotional and hence more 
powerful word to be used in advertising. No one likes a cheat but some may think 
fraud is almost acceptable. If we really want to strike a chord with people, using 
‘cheat’ will have greater impact and hence be more effective’ (Department of Social 
Protection, Internal Memo, April 11, 2016).  
 
14 For a detailed account of the workings of each of these schemes see www.welfare.ie  
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the imagined existence of a population of folk devils (cheats, scroungers) who are 
defrauding the system and ‘our’ money.   
Print Media Coverage  
In examining print media coverage we focused in particular on two pivotal moments in 
the campaign, namely its initial launch and the subsequent focus some three weeks later 
on the Minister’s stated intention to ‘name and shame’ welfare fraudsters.   
In our analysis we focused on the language employed and were interested in 
addressing the following questions:  
(1) To what extent was a hegemonic discourse replicated concerning welfare 
‘fraud’?  
(2) What were the main descriptors used in reference to welfare ‘fraud’?  
(3) To what degree was the reported scale and cost of welfare ‘fraud’ interrogated?  
Circulating and Challenging Hegemonic Discourse 
The term ‘crackdown’, with its connotations of taking more severe and immediate action 
was used four times in media coverage of the early phase of the campaign. In only one 
instance did the term appear in an article that was critical of the Minister’s actions and 
which called the reported levels of welfare fraud into account. It featured twice in 
conjunction with the terms ‘hard-hitting’ and ‘whistle-blowing’.  
Two news reports published on the morning of the campaign launch (April 18) 
replicated the phrase ‘hard-hitting’ which was originally contained in the Department of 
Social Protection’s press release (as was the term ‘whistle-blowers’).  The first appeared 
in The Irish Independent (Headline: Public Urged to Blow Whistle on Social Welfare 
Fraud, April 18, 2017).  The second appeared in the populist Irish Daily Mail (Headline: 
Stop The Fraudsters, April 18, 2017) and repeated the Minister’s assertion that savings 
of €500 million were made in 2016 owing to control and anti-fraud measures. The 
alarmist language used in that newspaper’s accompanying editorial lauds the Minister’s 
initiative as being a ‘step in the right direction’ and describes the actions of those said to 
be engaged in fraud as ‘milking the state’. Neither the reports nor the editorial offer any 
critique / counter narrative of / to the Minister’s assertions. Noteworthy too is the lack 
of attribution to the claims made in the Irish Daily Mail that ‘…the Department reviews 
around one million cases every year, and has saved around half a billion euro from these 
probes’. It is also worth noting that all three articles were published prior to the actual 
press launch event and depend heavily on the language and contents of the 
department’s press release, in the process evidencing how agendas are set regarding 
particular discursive frames. One interesting dimension in this campaign was the 
Minister’s assertion that welfare cheats were engaging in identity fraud (Headline: 
Welfare Cheats Using Make-up and Fake Beards to get Benefits won't beat the ID 
Software, warns Varadkar, Irish Independent, April 19, 2017). Mr Varadkar is reported as 
stating the ‘facial recognition technology […] was helping the Department of Social 
Protection find “doppelgangers” who try to double claim payments. “There are quite a 
few out there,” he said. The facial recognition software can identify “double people” out 
there. “Even people putting on make-up and beards and stuff. None of that works 
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because it's all based on bone structure.”’ (Irish Independent, April 19). That report is of 
further interest in that the Minister’s assertions are not challenged in any way.  
There were a small number of articles which countered the hegemonic discourse 
(Headline: Bankers Ruined Our Country, Leo – not Social Welfare Recipients, Irish 
Independent, May 9 and most notably in two letters to editor: ‘Leo’s Cruel Campaign’ 
(Irish Daily Mail, May 17) and ‘Welfare Fraud: A Culture of Hysteria?’ (Irish Time,s May 
17).) 
The campaign’s slogan ‘Welfare Cheats, Cheat Us All’ provided a strong cue for 
media discourse. In spite of the greater use of the terms ‘fraud’/ ‘welfare fraud’ in the 
department’s press release, the term ‘cheat’ predominated in the media’s coverage of 
the campaign and its aftermath, with seven instances of either ‘Welfare Cheats’ or 
‘Cheats’. There are a smaller number of references to the existence of ‘Benefit Cheats’ (1) 
and ‘Fraudsters’ (2). The terms ‘Welfare Cheats’ and ‘Social Welfare Cheats’ are inverted 
in just two instances. In another instance, a reporter refers to ‘so called fraud’ and in two 
other reports (in the Irish Independent) welfare recipients are identified as the poor, 
vulnerable and marginalised whom readers are told are being vilified by a campaign 
which treats them as leeches and cheats. One additional article argues that in 
comparison to the relatively low levels of welfare ‘fraud’ the real fraudsters are those 
who avoid/evade paying tax. As we will discuss later, the parodying of Varadkar’s 
campaign by a group of left-wing members of the Dail (Irish Parliament) in the form of 
bus advertising campaign entitled ‘Vulture Funds, Cheat Us All’ was reported on by the 
Irish Times on May 5 (Headline: Welfare Cheats Advert Inspires Imitation). The media’s 
construction of deviant outgroups as cheats and fraudsters stands in sharp contrast to 
the portrayal of the Minister. He is referred to in personal, first-name terms (Headline: 
We’ll Snoop On Social Media To Catch Welfare Fraud, Says Leo, Irish Daily Mail, April 
19). The sharp contrast between the familiar and the anonymised masses serves to 
further underscore the assumed threat of the welfare fraudsters.  
As the Fine Gael leadership contest gained momentum, the incumbent Minister 
for Social Protection announced a possible change to the Social Welfare legislation. It 
was proposed that the names of those found guilty of social welfare fraud would be 
published on a quarterly basis (Headline: Social Welfare Cheats to be ‘named and 
shamed’ and have benefits cut, Irish Independent, May 10; Headline: Welfare Cheats Will 
Be Shamed on Blacklist, Irish Examiner, May 10).  
The Numbers Game 
Accurate measurement based upon empirical evidence is essential in reaching an 
understanding of the true extent of welfare fraud. This includes separating out control 
savings from activities deemed to be fraudulent. Our review of statements made by 
successive Ministers since the economic collapse evidence repeated (unsubstantiated) 
assertions that welfare fraud is in excess of €500 million. As noted earlier, the conflation 
of control savings and activities deemed to be fraudulent is highly problematic (Taft, 
2011). In examining the 2016 campaign we were interested in asking to what extent did 
the reportage convey a clear understanding of what constitutes welfare fraud? Did it 
manage to disaggregate the reported figures in terms of ‘control measures’ and actual 
‘fraud’? Did the coverage include reference to empirical evidence of the actual extent of 
welfare fraud as opposed to people reporting their suspicions of fraudulent activity? An 
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appreciation of the numbers is at the core of understanding how this campaign mis-
represented welfare fraud.   
It is interesting to note that as late as June 12, the Irish Daily Mail claimed that 
‘More than €2.6 Billion was saved in the welfare fraud clampdown in the past five years’. 
However, the acceptance at face value of claims that welfare fraud was costing over 
€500 million per year was quickly contested by a number of newspapers, as was the 
difference between the numbers being reported by members of the public and the 
numbers of recipients found to be engaged in fraudulent activity. Some two weeks after 
the campaign launch, articles appeared in The Sunday Independent, The Irish Examiner 
and The Sunday Business Post that contradicted the numbers being reported by the 
Minister. Mr Varadkar was accused of circulating ‘fake news’ (The Irish Independent, May 
18). Columnist Gene Kerrigan stated: ‘If you are inventing a fraud problem, Leo, you 
ought at least to get the technical bit right’ (The Sunday Independent, April 30). The 
minister’s inability to count correctly was also commented upon by The Irish Examiner 
(Headline: Making The Numbers Count For Nothing, April 29). A comprehensive opinion 
piece by Sinn Fein TD Eoin O’Broin in The Sunday Business (April 26) set out to debunk 
the numbers being cited by Varadkar. Using official data, O’Broin was able to 
demonstrate that social welfare fraud in 2015 was less than €50 million (or one tenth of 
the figure claimed by Varadkar). Welfare fraud using fake identities was initially 
presented as being a growing practice. However, by May 30, 2017, in response to a Dail 
(parliamentary) question, it was eventually conceded that there had only been a single 
case in the previous twelve months (Headline: ‘Single case’ of Social-Welfare Identity 
Fraud Suspected This Year, Irish Times, May 30).  
Who Wants To Be A #Ratforleo    
One of the unintended consequences of media globalisation is that technological 
developments - particularly in the realm of social media - have allowed for the creation 
and spread of counter-hegemonic discourses. Twitter, Facebook and other platforms 
have facilitated the further development of sub-cultures of resistance. The ‘culture 
jamming’ referred to by Klein (1999) for example evidences how some audience 
members can engage in resistive strategies. Klein (1999) specifically refers to the 
practices of ‘ad-busting’ and ‘ad-bashing’ by anti-consumer activists, where, for example 
Nike’s ‘Just Do It’ became ‘Just Screw It’ and the Absolut Vodka slogan became ‘Absolute 
Nonsense’.  
Agentic practices involving the inversion of dominant discourses were in 
abundant evidence following the launch of the Welfare Cheats campaign. Activists who 
were critical of Mr Varadkar’s campaign subverted the title of his own Twitter handle 
@campaignforleo by creating the hashtag #Ratforleo. It was first used on April 20, just 
two days after the campaign launch. This hashtag was used extensively up to December 
2017 in reference to the Welfare Cheats campaign, in response to his election campaign 
to become leader of Fine Gael and Taoiseach (Prime Minister) and as a means of 
criticising Mr Varadkar and the neo-liberal policies of Fine Gael, more generally. The use 
of the word ‘rat’ implies the act of informing and has a long history in terms of both 
policing and the prison system. To rat or the practice of ‘ratting’ is widely frowned upon.    
#Ratforleo was repeatedly used to point out the different ways in which the rich 
and powerful are treated vis-a-vis the poor. For example, one tweeter wrote ‘Ireland, 
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where welfare claimants are cheats, but multinational corporations like Apple who rob 
us of €13bn are fine?’ (see Brennan, 2017 for a discussion of the Apple Tax case). 
Another stated: ‘Check out our social welfare minister’s brainwave. He is Irish tory 
party. Divide and conquer the poor.’ The culture jamming extended to other pro-
sumption  or produser activities in which official photographs from the campaign launch 
were photoshopped to subvert their initial intended meaning. One replaced the original 
slogan ‘Welfare Cheats, Cheat Us All’ with the phrase ‘Corporate Tax Cheats Cheat Us All’, 
while another stated ‘Mass Immigration Cheats Us All, (excluding slumlords, 
wageslavers and immigration industry)’. A further example of culture jamming was in 
evidence in the circulation online of a picture parodying the television show ‘Who Wants 
To Be A Millionaire?’. In ‘Who Wants To Be The Leader of Fine Gael?’ Mr Varadkar has 
been asked the question who cost the state €64 billion and counting? The possible 
answers were: A. Lone Parents, B. The Unemployed, C. The Homeless and D. The Banks.   
Resisting the dominant narrative concerning welfare fraud was not however restricted 
to the activities of online activists. We also note the presence of an alternative and more 
modest media campaign funded by a number of TDs (members of the Irish Parliament) 
who were part of the Independents4change grouping. The ‘Vulture Funds Cheat Us All 
Campaign’ encouraged members of the public to report on any suspicious activities by 
the state owned ‘bad bank’ National Management Agency (NAMA) and the numerous 
speculative vulture funds in operation in the Republic of Ireland. The group paid €7,260 
for the advertising campaign which featured on 50 buses in Dublin City for a fortnight. 
Parodying Varadkar’s media campaign, the posters told the public ‘If you have 
information of malpractice in Nama or Vulture Funds contact namaleaks.com’ (see 
O’Halloran, 2017).  
 
It is interesting to note that by the end of 2017 it was finally conceded by the 
Department of Social Protection that the campaign was problematic. At the Public 
Accounts Committee, the Department’s head admitted: ‘Putting the word cheat beside 
the word welfare … I think we’ve learned from that. In retrospect I believe it was a 
mistake.’  He added: ‘You take the best advice from professional advisors in advertising 
and marketing and communications companies. You take their advice and you run with 
it’ (McKeon, 2017). Crucially, he also revealed that in 2016 ‘…most of the €110 million in 
overpayments […] related to errors made by the department's customers rather than 
deliberate fraud’ (McKeon, 2017).  Furthermore, it was publicly acknowledged that the 
level of fraud being reported by the department (2%) was in fact a merging of two sets 
of figures – 0.6% suspected fraud with a 1.4% of departmental error.   
So what were the achievements of the Welfare Cheats Cheat Us All campaign? 
How did it influence social action and public perceptions of welfare fraud? Again it is 
interesting to look at one brief snapshot of public opinion in this regard. An opinion poll 
conducted for the RTE Claire Byrne Live15 current affairs television programme on May 
                                                             
15 The Claire Byrne Live show is part of RTE’s suite of current affairs programming.  It 
combines panel discussions, interviews and high levels of audience participation. 
The show regularly makes use of polling data to offer viewers a sense of the public 
mood. It has an average viewership of 250,000.  
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29, 2017 asked its 1,000 respondents ‘Are government campaigns that ask people to 
report welfare cheats a good idea?’. 64% responded in the affirmative; 22% said no and 
14% didn’t know. It is clear that the campaign resulted in an increase in the numbers of 
suspected welfare fraud being reported. In comparison to the same period in 2016 
(April 18 to June 24) there was an increase of 1,537 reports by members of the public, 
rising from 3,322 to 4,859 (see Dáil Éireann Debates, Vol. 955 No. 1, June 21). However, 
we also know that in spite of the campaign, the numbers detected as engaging in welfare 
fraud by the Department of Social Protection in fact dropped by one third in 2017 (see 
Gallagher, 2017).  In the first nine months of 2017, the department detected 928 cases 
per month of what was deemed to be welfare fraud. It is essential to put these figures in 
context. In April 2017, for example, when Varadkar launched this campaign there were 
266,600 people on the Live Register (CSO), thus 928 cases represents a figure of 0.35% 
of fraud.  Costing €3.38 million a month, this equates with €40.5 million a year – a far 
cry from the €500 million being spoken and written about as the extent of fraud during 
the campaign (see Taft, 2011). 
Conclusions 
This article contributes to our understanding of how discourses concerning 
social welfare fraud are created, disseminated and responded to. By analysing a corpus 
consisting of pre-planning memos; a press release; campaign materials; press coverage 
and online discussion, we have been able to focus on the linguistic choices made in 
creating, reporting on and responding to the Welfare Cheats Cheat Us All campaign. We 
find that the discussions in the run up to the launch of the Welfare Cheats Cheat Us All 
campaign (documented in the internal memos) about whether to use the word ‘fraud’ or 
‘cheat’ were of significance. The chosen word was deliberate, and it was underpinned by 
a knowledge of the communicative power of the chosen word versus its competitor. We 
would argue that the information about the scale of ‘fraud’ was available to the planners 
at the time they decided to launch the campaign. Yet something happened over the 
course of the campaign to make them retract their claims by the end of 2017. We argue 
that the retraction evidences the power of counter hegemonic discourses (circulated via 
certain journalists and politicians), and counter hegemonic narratives such as the 
#ratforleo campaign (circulated via social media) to challenge the dominant discourses 
circulating at any given time. Hegemony, as Gramsci reminded us a long time ago, is 
never total or complete. Interrogating the language used by public servants, consultants, 
media agencies, journalists, politicians and ordinary citizens is central to understanding 
how ‘common-sense’ assumptions concerning welfare fraud are encoded and circulated. 
Discourses which, far from being neutral, serve to represent and perpetuate the 
interests of the dominant political and economic establishment (see Power et al., 2016).  
In this article we have demonstrated the circumstances by which dominant discourses 
on welfare (see Garrett, 2017), which are based on well-worn tropes and mythologies16 
rather than on empirical evidence can also be resisted and subverted. We have 
demonstrated how a counter-hegemonic narrative quickly emerged in a variety of 
settings to contest the raison detre of this campaign. It was accused of engaging in 
                                                             
16 These discourses act as a cognitive prompt, framing the issues … and function as 
linguistic references facilitating the general public in strengthening previously held 
beliefs about welfare and welfare recipients (see Edelman, 1998; Lens, 2002). 
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hysteria and of being a hate campaign (see Irish Times, May 10).  In spite of previous 
criticisms of how welfare fraud is defined and represented in an Irish context by the 
Comptroller and Auditor General, the campaign repeated the erroneous conflation of 
fraud and control savings. Like many others (political commentators, journalists, etc.) 
we hold that the campaign cannot be separated out from the Minister’s wider political 
ambitions to become leader of Fine Gael. The timing and language of the campaign, and 
the language17 used by Varadkar had, we argue, more to do with sending a signal to his 
prospective electorate in Fine Gael than to the wider public. In this regard, given the 
subsequent election of Mr Varadkar as leader of Fine Gael, we would argue that the 
campaign actually achieved its aim. The collateral damage was the further demonisation 
of welfare recipients and the construction of welfare as fraud.   
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